Neoliberal globalisation and the triple crisis of ‘modernisation’ in Africa: Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Africa

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ABSTRACT  Neoliberal globalisation has renewed and accelerated the triple crisis of capitalist modernisation in Africa. Primitive accumulation, nation-state formation and democratisation remain uncompleted tasks. Neoliberal globalisation simultaneously encourages these trends yet makes them difficult to resolve, given its anti-statism, its exclusionary version of democracy, and the violence inherent in the emergence of private property rights out of pre-capitalist modes of production that have been mediated by colonial and postcolonial institutions and the dynamics of the Cold War. The elements of the modernisation triad are inextricably intertwined, yet in varying social contexts take on unique patterns. To highlight each element in the triple crisis of ‘modernisation’, this article separates and ‘applies’ them to three ‘southern’ African countries. The notion of primitive accumulation is the theoretical lens through which the Zimbabwean crisis is viewed. The war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is analysed through the prism of nation-state construction. South Africa, the most ‘developed’ (albeit particularly unevenly ‘developed’) society under study here will be examined through the framework of ‘democratisation’.

Studies of globalisation often ignore, or provide only passing coverage of, Africa.1 Globalisation literature—with all its epistemological problems2—is devoted largely to the advanced capitalist portion of the global political economy where all the indices of production integration,3 shrinking distance,4 and the advance of the ‘informationalisation mode of production’ are on the increase.5 Where attention is devoted to the ‘Third World’, it concentrates on the rise and fall—and maybe rise again—of the newly industrialised countries of Asia. Africa seems ‘off the map’, rarely noticed aside from the fact that less capital is invested there now than in the 1960s, that poverty is increasing, that its debts continue to grow and its wars never end. As The Economist epitomises, caricaturing African societies as ‘especially susceptible to … brutality, despotism and corruption …
for reasons buried deep in their cultures’, the continent’s battles appear to the average observer as primordial, or driven by leaders who are all too easily labelled as ‘crazy’. Progressive intellectuals and journalists may portray the World Bank’s and IMF’s activities in Africa as the ‘recolonisation’ of the dark continent, but they are nearly as deterministic and Eurocentric as less sympathetic writing and often still fail to advance beyond various revised versions of dependency theory. ‘Globalisation’ seems to be the same old story for Africa.

The argument being mounted here advances differently. The post-cold war predicament, structured by the ideology and practice of global neoliberalism and the attendant lack of alternatives to it, aside from nebulous ‘new political networks [building] the global linkages and institutions’, actually affects Africa profoundly. In the already capitalist world globalisation is about the deepening of commodity relations, the privatisation of formerly public services, the search for cheaper and more productive labour, coping with crises of over-accumulation and underconsumption, and the collapse of space and time—all in an ideological world seemingly devoid of other options. Globalisation is different in Africa. There, the birth of capitalism and modernity is starting all over again. The continent is renewing its violence-laden movement through primitive accumulation, nation-state formation, and democratisation to capitalist modernity. This process has been released from the shackles—or protective barriers, depending on how one views the fall of various non-capitalist modes of production, of statist ‘rent-seeking’ and patron–client opportunities, and of policies of industrial and agricultural protection in the face of capitalism’s advance and the commodification of everyday life—of Cold War politics and Keynesian-style economics. Yet the path to capitalism is far from smooth. Land-tenure relations are becoming more and more ‘private’, but the transition through primitive accumulation is just beginning and there are not the industrial means to absorb a new proletariat. Colonial boundaries and their states are falling apart, but they are not disappearing. They are taking new forms, and have more difficult tasks to perform than ever before, but their fundamental ambiguity rests in the fact that they have less ‘room for manoeuvre’ than in previous decades. Polities are undergoing processes of democratisation, no longer as hard under the thumbs of colonial and one-party regimes of the past century—but they are not enjoying the civil, let alone social, promises of liberal democracy.

If one celebrates this ‘first stage’ of globalisation, all the violence—and increasing inequality—of these transitions can be seen as but blips on progress’s screen: the necessary, if painful, signposts to progress. If one condemns Africa’s role in post-cold war capitalism, one sees these symptoms as part of a global disease. Whatever end of the pole, one is obliged to be diagnostic and prognostic. Whether ‘Warrenite’ or dependencia schools of historical materialism are the best with which to analyse the current moment is an open question. The following assessment of the crises of primitive accumulation in Zimbabwe, nation-state formation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo), and democratisation in South Africa may assist in the choice of optimism or pessimism on such scores.

Does the dark side of capitalism’s progress in Africa overwhelm the light? While Africa’s processes of ‘modernisation’ accelerate in the post-cold war era,
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its current situation imposes great difficulties on the process. As Berger illustrates, in the introduction to this special issue, there remains little of the ‘national’ shell for the development process in Africa.\textsuperscript{12} The fragile casing constructed during the 1960s and 1970s that was just beginning to provide the means for nation-making and state-building, as messy a process as that is, has now all but disappeared. Yet, as Hardt and Negri illustrate, the identities constructed in the process of nation building are essential for capitalist development.\textsuperscript{13} If globalisation is taking these means away from Africa, what chance does capitalism (let alone something more progressive) have? This paper’s examination of the crisis of nation-state formation in the Great Lakes region, including especially the relationship between the DR Congo and Rwanda in the context of the political economy of war, will investigate this contradiction.\textsuperscript{14} War modes of production—networked very tightly with a global political economy of arms, drugs, and resources—in battle-torn central Africa are not conducive to the construction of chains of accumulation benefiting existing states. They may or may not lead to the formation of new nation-state structures.\textsuperscript{15}

Another axiom of capitalist development is the universalisation of private property, or, for Marxists, the fulfilment of the primitive accumulation process. Resolving the ‘land question’ in Zimbabwe (and increasingly in South Africa\textsuperscript{16}) could conceivably realise capitalism’s cornerstone relatively equitably (in the beginning, before differentiation sets in). However, its 20-year deferral in Zimbabwe (after a good start\textsuperscript{17}) for lack of international assistance and fears of global disapprobation in a context of domestic class stalemate has led to today’s crisis, which raises the question of whether such a process can ever be violence-free.

The radical rhetoric of the ‘second Cold War’\textsuperscript{18} in Africa now sounds hollow when mouthed by politicians who misspent the opportunity allowed by the Cold War conjuncture.\textsuperscript{19} Thus working class alternatives to agrarian/authoritarian—and increasingly racist—populism are susceptible to the neoliberalism that urban and rural discourses should challenge.\textsuperscript{20} This chapter will shed light on how primitive accumulation’s post-settler colonial twist combines with global influences in a time of deep political crisis in a once ‘Marxist–Leninist’ ruling party.\textsuperscript{21}

Finally, we are led to believe that in the globalised era political democratisation and economic liberalisation march together: ‘Good governance’ and ‘democracy’ programmes bloom all over Africa. They promise the liberal democratic verities of freedom and human rights along with their material prerequisites. However, structural adjustment policies deny the means for the latter. The dictates of neoliberal economic policies in societies already structured by scarcity mean that democracy’s promises turn out to be lies: liberal democracy on the edge of empire is very thin indeed. Here too the lure of globalisation turns out to be dangerous.\textsuperscript{22} South Africa—the most modern of the three case studies, and a keystone for the continent—will be examined through the lens of democratisation theory broadly conceived.\textsuperscript{23}

Discussion of these social formations may illuminate the question of whether the imperatives of the post-cold war global political economy impose restrictions on the resolution of the triple crises of capitalist modernisation. Does the post-cold war predicament close off Africa’s development, or does it allow its
unfolding? If the former is true, the search for alternatives will be harder than during the first (cold war) era of post-colonialism.

**Zimbabwe: primitive accumulation with a twist**

For some, the Zimbabwean crisis is ‘political’, not an effort to redress long-deferred land inequalities. This is partially true—the Robert Mugabe regime instigated the land invasions only when it feared that it would lose the 2000 parliamentary elections. The invasions were not the spontaneous efforts of the subjects of an artificially prolonged communal mode of production wanting to become capitalist farmers. Nor were they the result of long-laid plans and programmes. One can accept the ‘political’ label, however, only if one separates the ‘political’ from the ‘socioeconomic’. The politics of the crisis would not have taken their current form if nearly half of Zimbabwe’s population did not reside and work on ‘communal lands’ with ‘customary’ rules of tenure. The crisis-hit regime turned to the land issue precisely because it had not been solved in the 20 years of its rule. To be sure, the issue can only be solved in a political way, involving the Zimbabwean state, states in the core of the global capitalist system, local and global capital—and the Zimbabwean peasantry. It remains to be seen whether the current round of invasions transforms the lives of those in the ‘communal’ areas that cover roughly half the country. Instead, they may be but a solution to a ‘political’ problem that will turn an unemployed urban and destitute rural population into very small and perhaps unsustainable petty commodity producers—displacing a similar number of agricultural workers. The question is: will a process that has led to the state’s plans to take over 5000 commercial farms on eight million hectares of Zimbabwe’s fertile land solve or merely defer the problem of primitive accumulation? Will leaving the mostly white commercial farmers with 800 farms solve the problem? (The state claimed in mid-2001 that it had already taken over 2500 farms on over 3.5 million hectares, with 105 000 families resettled. Few are serviced. Over 300 000 agricultural workers may lose their jobs.)

The resolution of the primitive accumulation question in Zimbabwe is tied up inextricably with globalisation. The World Bank’s *sine qua non* is private property and an idyllic vision of small farmers (to hide the brutal dispossession of traditional rights and the conflict-ridden process of proletarianisation). Its 1997 study of the ‘state in a changing world’ asserted that the primary function of the Third World state was to universalise private property rights. Why then, should not Zimbabwe’s seven million people with only ‘traditional’ land rights be ushered into the fold? The entry of other facets of globalisation into the equation must be examined. First, the British and US states hesitated to follow through on promises of assistance for land reform made at the closure of the national liberation struggle. The coincidental structural adjustment policies of the late 1980s and 1990s denied the state the means to pay for the acquisition of land. Second, the white commercial farmers were able to lobby effectively to convince the state and the ‘international community’ that they were (and are) Zimbabwe’s breadbasket. Third, the ‘embourgeoisement’ of the Zimbabwean ruling class has to be accounted for: some of its leading members have been keener to take
commercial farms for themselves than to redistribute them. Corruption and other means of access to conspicuous consumption facilitated by the inequality-producing aspects of structural adjustment programmes have created a class benefiting more from globalisation than from the Leninist promises and processes of giving ‘land to the tiller’. All these factors are grounded in colonial history.

Colonialism and the Cold War in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe’s recent history can be divided into the ‘cold-war’ and ‘post-cold war’ eras. Each period has affected the issue of primitive accumulation and the class stalemate leading to the current crisis in important ways. However, both moments of contemporary history are structured by the basic dilemma of settler-colonialism. When in the 1890s the white settlers introduced capitalism to their conquered land, both the farmers and the mine-owners among them had an interest in stifling the commodity-producing aspirations of their subjects. First, the settlers took land from Africans — this was a form of primitive accumulation, but it did not involve full proletarianisation. Later, the white farmers feared the competition of the remaining African peasant farmers: in the early twentieth century many of the latter were getting quite rich. Mine-owners did not want Africans to earn money from sources other than labouring underground, but they also wanted to keep wages low. They preferred Africans to retain access to land, but not to have agriculture compete with mine labour as a source of income: their interests were also served by restricting ‘native’ agriculture to subsistence. Thus Rhodesia ended up with a partially proletarianised African population confined to reservations, ruled by ‘chiefs’ actually employed by the colonial state. The process of primitive accumulation was only partially completed: Africans were removed from the best land and restricted to poorer ‘reserves’. Proletarianisation was halted, as Africans were expected to live in cities and to work in the mines for limited periods only. Their access to ‘middle class’ occupations and capitalist positions was also restricted. Rhodesian settler-colonialism offered only a shell of capitalism to most Africans. Its universal pretensions were clouded not by race alone, but by most capitalist’s propensities to restrict competition.

After the Second World War Southern Rhodesia underwent a quick doubling of its white population: the ‘statism’ of welfarist Britain came with them. It entrenched subsidies for white settler agriculture, safe and ‘skilled’ jobs for white workers, and a state redoubt for bureaucrats managing the contradictions of a social formation in which welfare capitalism nestled alongside a racially constructed, stalled form of primitive accumulation. Mild liberalism accompanied this moment: a small ‘master farmer’ class of Africans was created under the leadership of Garfield Todd, while some gestures were made towards the proletarianisation of the rural dwellers ousted by such a process. An African nationalist movement was formed, merging urban petty bourgeois and working class aspirations with peasant grievances. By the 1960s such social change was greeted with the conservatism epitomised by Ian Smith’s Rhodesian Front. African nationalism, when seen in combination with events such as the Congo crisis to the north and the ‘great communist conspiracy’ that was a metanarrative.
of the Cold War, was too much to take for those seeing themselves as defenders of the Empire’s heritage. The shift to the right meant that the nationalists were forced into armed struggle to achieve what were essentially liberal aims: one person, one vote. Again, the universal reach of capitalist modernity exceeded the grasp of the Cold War moment, but, ironically, what Western liberals called ‘totalitarianism’ pushed their peripheral offshoots into their park.

The deepening of the armed struggle in the 1970s resulted in the importation of aid and ideology from the ‘communist side(s)’ of the superpower divide. ‘Young Turks’ inspired by many variations of Marxism challenged liberal nationalists: Chinese, Soviet and ‘third worldist’ streams entered the fray. They may have exacerbated other fracturing tendencies, but they exposed nationalism’s frailty from within: the ‘petty-bourgeois’ leaders were challenged from the left.33 From the right, the imperial powers feared the threat of radicalisation. In 1976 Henry Kissinger, their chief diplomat, tried to negotiate a settlement forcing the intransigent white settlers to accept a ‘moderate’ leadership: that it took nearly four years is either testament to the power of ‘the left’ within the liberation movement, or a mark of the complexity of the situation. In any case, without support from the left side of the bipolar world, the war for majority rule in Zimbabwe might never have started, or might have ended up as so many wars in Africa now: as, in Malaquias’s words, no more than ‘criminal insurgencies.’34 On the other hand, without the possibility of support, the nationalists might have settled for a ‘15-year plan’ for majority rule through gradual enlargements of the franchise offered in the early 1960s—and liberals would not have feared them.

Before the Zimbabwean liberation war, the Rhodesian state was interventionist: it subsidised white farmers heavily, encouraged industry and, contradictorily, stalled African primitive accumulation. When sanctions were imposed after Rhodesia declared ‘unilateral independence’, state-led industrial policies were given a further boost. Ironically, Rhodesia became a model for a Frankian form of ‘delinking’. Exchange and currency controls, along with a basic-needs form of industrialisation (‘basic needs’ being, of course, ‘white’ basic needs!) meant that the ‘development’ indices of the rogue state rose quickly—unless, of course, one included black Africans in the equation.35

Post-colonial crisis

At the time of independence in 1980 the ‘third worldist’ regime that emerged in Zimbabwe, under the leadership of The Zimbabwean African National Union (Patriotic Front) (ZANU–PF), combined shades of Nyererism and Marxist–Leninism with a Rhodesian history of state interventionism to offer a package that looked slightly social democratic (if a mini-genocide in Matabeleland is ignored).36 Even land reform got off to a good start. As Bill Kinsey notes, Africa has not seen such a successful programme—but, as Lionel Cliffe adds, it all happened within the first four years of independence.37 However, Zimbabwe’s social democratic tendencies barely got off the ground when, in the context of the demise of the ‘golden age of capitalism’ in the West and the debt crisis in the South, the global wave of Hayekian economic ideology became hegemonic. Within years, a combination of World Bank and local bourgeois pressure pushed
Zimbabwe into structural adjustment programmes, the ramifications of which are now well known across Africa as a whole.\(^3\) Aside from the misery imposed on the population—and the benefits that go to a petty-bourgeoisie and bourgeoisie gaining from cheaper luxury imports and consultancies paid in foreign currency—the results of such policies were that, from 1993 to 1998, ‘Zimbabwe had paid US$910 million more in debt servicing than it received in new loans’, yet its debt had increased ‘from US$4.54 to US$4.72 billion’. Only Brazil had a higher debt–export ratio: in 1998 Zimbabwe spent well over two-fifths of its export earnings on debt.\(^\)\(^3\)

Little wonder that the events of late 1997 threw Zimbabwe’s fiscus into deep disarray, and the crisis quickly spread. In September 1997 the War Veterans’ Association (WVA) marched into the presidential house—meeting no resistance from the Presidential Guard—demanding a meeting with Robert Mugabe alone. They gained a number of promises: a lump sum of Z$50,000 and a tax-free monthly pension of Z$5,000 for their 50,000 members, and guarantees of speedier land resettlement, with 20% for veterans.\(^3\) By year’s end the state earmarked 1471 farms for ‘immediate compulsory acquisition and with only partial compensation … (for infrastructural developments on the land but not for the land itself)’. ZANU-PF wanted to procure ‘five million hectares of commercial farmland for the proposed resettlement of an additional 110,000 families’.\(^\)\(^4\)

In early 1998, while the Zimbabwean dollar was facing its worst devaluation since 1980 and food subsidies were reduced, ZANU-PF imposed a 5% surtax to pay for the veterans’ deal. Demonstrations (marking the first time Zimbabwean citizens were killed by their soldiers) and a ZCTU general strike forced the levy’s cancellation, but the pensions remained. Mugabe claimed that white capital and the black working class had allied against the veterans and peasants. In the middle of the year, Zimbabwe entered the DR Congo war to support Laurent-Désiré Kabila, and perhaps to lay claim to many of his diamond and gold mines. By the end of 1998 only 350 of the 1471 farms were still listed for resettlement; they were reduced by legal challenges and the cancellation of British aid, purportedly because too many farms were going into the hands of cabinet ministers. IMF funds were also stopped because of misreporting of the costs and financing of the DR Congo war: some US$1 million daily. Reports claimed that by the end of 1999 the state had not taken any farms and could not pay for the single farm its owner was trying to sell to it.\(^4\) Land reform seemed stalled.

Aggravating ZANU-PF’s political crisis, by September 1999 ‘opposition’ increasingly took party-political form. The National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) and the Zimbabwean Congress of Trade Unions created the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), while the NCA also initiated a process to write a new constitution. It was pre-empted by ZANU-PF, but the ruling party failed to pass a February 2000 referendum on its draft. That disappointment made it evident that the parliamentary elections due in a few months would be difficult to win. To stave off that possibility, either army leaders, the WVA or the president decided that the reserve army of the unemployed could become land invaders. Thus was renewed the nearly forgotten liberation war praxis: the farms not taken over in the 1964–80 war or the ensuing resettlement programmes were targeted again.

During the invasion of 1500 to 1800 farms and the election campaign, more
than 30 commercial farmers, opposition candidates, and their supporters were killed. ZANU-PF won only 62 of the 120 seats, while the MDC won 57: the latter is challenging about 20 more on grounds of violations of ‘free and fair’ conditions. However, the constitution allows the president to appoint 30 members to the legislature, and he retains executive powers until the presidential election of 2002. Its preliminaries seem worse than those of the last: food crisis, intimidation of MDC members and supporters, rumours of military coups and states of emergency, confiscation of foreign currency accounts, flourishing black markets, plenty of politician’s car accidents, and an upping of the ‘race’ ante add up to crisis writ large. As for the impact of ‘globalisation’, perhaps the question has been raised by the International Crisis Group: will the international ‘community’ intervene to impose sanctions and support its version of democracy along with a ‘rational’ programme of land reform?

Concluding Zimbabwe

The twists of this tale of primitive accumulation are tangled indeed. White settler colonialism is a result of both the liberalising and colonising moments of the late 19th and twentieth centuries. Yet this global spread of property relations stopped with Zimbabwe’s racial divide: it took a war sponsored in part by ‘communist’ forces ostensibly opposed to private property to open the wave up again. The ironies continue: the social democratic reforms necessary to bring private property relations to the Zimbabwean majority were thwarted by a combination of British and US neoliberals whose funding stopped well short of needs (and promises). The loudest foreign voices advocating private property failed to put their money where their mouths were. Those who were getting capital were members of the new Zimbabwean elite, who were quite happy to inherit the inequitable patterns of the past (with the added distorting benefits of structural adjustment). The strangest twist is that it is only by breaking laws protecting private property that more Zimbabweans can be introduced to it (assuming they will be allowed to stay on the land they have invaded). The resolution of the primitive accumulation problem in Zimbabwe will not be immediately ‘productive’. It will undoubtedly lead to many more crises. Of course such ironies are not apparent to those with blind spots on the role of the state—especially when it is a Bonapartist one—and on the violence accompanying the process of primitive accumulation. Those observers include some who prophesied peace and history’s end when the Cold War closed: in Zimbabwe at least, history is just restarting.

Democratic Republic of the Congo: nation-state formation or war mode of production?

For many Congolese, the key to the current, post-cold war crisis is to bring the fragile nation-state back from the brink of terminal Mobutism. Many of the DR Congo’s neighbours and the ‘rebels’ under their patronage are intent on expanding their reach, either for security or extractive reasons. Therein lies a major contradiction in Central Africa: Republic of the Congo/Zaire/Democratic Republic of the Congo, a product of the Cold War, has never been able to come
to ‘full’ nation-statehood while its neighbours—also experiencing intense problems in that regard—are currently attempting to solve many of their problems in the vacuum on its borders. Tied up with this contradiction—one that has caused the death of nearly 2.5 million people in the past three years—is the fact that the first ‘rebels’ in the 1998 war have been fighting as if they are still engaged in the African national liberation wars of the cold-war era. Yet the context in which they are operating is very much part of the post-cold war ‘warlord’ pattern of political economy. Professor Ernest Wamba dia Wamba’s Rally for Congolese Democracy (now variously called the Rally for Congolese Democracy—Kisangani or the Rally for Congolese Democracy—Movement for Liberation (RCD-ML)) started its alliance with the governments of Rwanda and Uganda against Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s ill-fated régime with the democratically inspired and left-leaning aspirations of a liberation movement that progressives in the rest of the world had supported in the 1960s and 1970s. It is not a ‘non-ideological, non-Clausewitzian and non-revolutionary’ movement. Its ideology is distinctly radical and, now, peaceful. As Horace Campbell reiterates, RCD-ML proposes:

cease-fire, face to face negotiations, unbanning of all political parties, withdrawal of foreign forces, international peacekeeping force under the auspices of the United Nations, arrest of those who committed genocide, reconvening of the national conference, a government of national unity and economic reconstruction to lay the basis for elections and normal political and economic activities.

However, the RCD-ML has been all but eliminated from the military scene by those more akin to ‘criminal’ insurgents who ‘in the absence of a global ideological divide … are sustained by more regional factors of political economy, ethnicity … personal ambition and greed’. The United Nations report on the illegal extraction of raw material from the DR Congo confirms such claims. It supports the analyses of Malaquias, Reno, and Duffield suggesting that the post-cold war predicament in Africa is characterised by war modes of production dominated by illegal resource extraction, not national liberation wars that are the means to new, more ‘modern’ nation-state formations. However, Berger’s analysis of the post-cold war predicament suggests, contrary to Malaquias, that there is a nascent global ideological divide, perhaps between Leslie Sklair’s transnational ruling class and Naomi Klein’s ‘no logo’ resistance. If that is so, the latter have very little knowledge of or means to assist the RCD-ML: for them, the rebels in the Congo are at best warlords in the employ of Rwanda and Uganda or, at worst, atavistic reminders of Kurtzian metaphors. If its more organised and on-the-ground contingents—the humanitarians Hardt and Negri salute as the new world order’s vanguard making all people human through a universal social wage—are a better indication of the good side of globalisation, it seems that at this juncture they can do little but apply sticking plaster. As Washington’s ignoring of the genocide in Rwanda illustrates (and one must emphasise that Rwanda’s tragedy is near the heart of the Congo’s) there is very little hope for a ‘humanitarian agenda’ without the participation of the head of ‘empire’.

Unless that head changes dramatically, warlord economics will prevail in wartorn Africa. There are few indications that the requisite changes are on the
way: it is said that, of the eight most powerful African policy makers in Washington, four would like to see the Congo carved up. These follow the thinking of Walter H Kansteiner III, who believes a ‘radical approach’ to the Great Lakes problem:

would be to divide territory between the two primary ethnic groups. Creating homogeneous ethnic lands would probably necessitate redrawing international boundaries and would require massive ‘voluntary’ relocation efforts, shifting Tutsis to a newly created Tutsi state and likewise for Hutus.55

This would mean denying all the efforts made since the Organisation of African Unity decided that, as arbitrary as the colonial boundaries set by the Berlin Conference (1884–85) were, it was better not to break any more eggs in the pursuit of omelettes whose quality would not be guaranteed. Presumably the four US policy makers specialising in Africa who do not want to carve up the Congo share this sentiment (with most Congolese), although they are undoubtedly looking for a new Mobutu in the shape of the new Kabila—as long as he does not ‘Africanise’ the economy in the manner of his predecessors—to protect projected mining investments. The rudderless nature of US foreign policy in the region is symptomatic of the post-cold war predicament: those who only ‘govern at a distance’ do not care who manages ‘hinterland’ states as long as they guarantee access to cheap resources.56 Lumumba used to say that the Congo is ‘too big for the imperialists to digest’: after the Cold War it can barely be chewed, let alone swallowed. With the tarnishing of Clinton’s ‘new generation’ of African leaders epitomised by the Ugandan and Rwandan presidents, the messiness of warlord economies, and the ineffectiveness of structural adjustment policies even when there is no war, there may no longer even be a desire to put central Africa on Washington’s plate.

Until there is a new African agenda—which would have to be of Marshall Plan proportions for the DR Congo alone—groups such as the RCD are forced to rely on regional sponsors even for basic security. Without transformation propitious for democratic contestation, the remaining ‘radical’ elements of the RCD were obliged to rely on an impatient Uganda—whose generals benefit materially from alliances with warlord elements representing the antithesis of RCD-ML ideology—just to survive. Without Ugandan support the RCD has been exiled to the political wilderness and, at the time of writing (August 2001), has only a tentative place at the tables of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue.57 Full appreciation of this very complex deadlock in the process of nation-state formation can only be gained through a study of the historical influence of ‘globalisation’ in Central Africa.

Globalisation then and now in the Congo

It is a cliché to cite the reign of King Leopold in the late 19th and early twentieth century as the main source of the Congo’s long-term crisis.58 Linking the country’s catastrophes to historic phases of globalisation (or its nascent forms) is more complicated. At the height of the 19th century scramble for Africa—part of the most intense phase of global economic liberalisation and integration until the age of neoliberalism—the death of perhaps 10 million hewers of rubber and ivory
while the king of a late-industrialising and colonising Belgium jumped on the colonial bandwagon signified the worst consequences of global reach. Nor should the extent of US corporate involvement be underestimated at this time: the Belgian Congo ‘free-state’ offered one of the first direct avenues to US involvement in the continent.59

Halfway down the road to the current moment of globalisation, at the beginning of the Cold War, the playing out of the ‘great contest’ between the USA and the USSR had particularly tumultuous effects in the Congo. The demise of Lumumba and the rise of Mobutu signified the power both to eliminate and to cultivate leaders of the ‘free’ side of cold-war politics at its worst: the one-time CIA chief George Bush’s personal friend (Mobutu visited Bush’s personal home at least a dozen times during his reign60) created a style of rule that signified patron–client politics run amuck. Kleptocracy—a means of playing off a series of regional and ethnic power brokers against each other by pushing millions of dollars to allies and then depriving them of access when they threatened rivalry—would not have been possible without the no-strings-attached billions from the coffers of the world’s democratic leader. Even when in 1973 Mobutu nationalised all Zaire’s foreign assets—in order to distribute them to allies, not to initiate a radical industrialisation and nation-building policy—American tokens of appreciation for supporting the ‘anti-communist’ Savimbi forces in Angola continued to pour in.

However, both the rise of neoliberalism and the end of the Cold War forced Mobutu to liberalise the economy. A modicum of the same medicine was applied to the polity. Without the resources of the past, Mobutism threatened to wind down into a complex and chaotic array of ‘informal economies’, interminable constitutional conferences, and repression of dissent. Simultaneously, the crisis of Rwandan ethno-nationalism (coincident with an economic crisis induced by lowered coffee prices and structural adjustment, and abetted by inappropriate aid and democratisation policies61) erupted into genocide and the beginning of the Interahamwe’s reformation on Zairian soil. The diminution of the Cold War’s most potent African symbol was epitomised by Kabila’s 1996–97 march into Kinshasa—a march accompanied by a second genocide of nearly 250 000 Hutu—while mining companies signed contracts in the hope of a new post-Mobutu dispensation.62 When Kabila reneged on these contracts and it looked like a re-nationalisation was about to occur, some mining companies took him to international court while others negotiated their way back in. Coincidentally or not with fears that Kabila was no longer acting as a protector of their security, in August 1998 his former Rwandan and Ugandan allies, and the democrats in the Congo who thought he might have been a revolutionary beacon—in 1996–7, turned against him to start the current war.

The distorted processes of Rwandan nation-state formation, combined with the political economy of neoliberal war, are still wreaking havoc in the DR Congo. Meanwhile, there are slight processes of globalisation working against that mayhem. The leaders of the RCD-ML are very much cosmopolitans, sharing many of the qualities of the ‘new political networks’ mentioned by Berger in the introduction to this special issue. Their view of radical participatory politics and economic reconstruction needs the solid boundaries of a nation-state to protect it:
thus they cultivate the Congo’s sovereignty. Yet they are very much ‘nomads’ akin to Hardt and Negri’s harbingers of global justice: (perhaps they are cosmopolitan nationalists) forced out of their former zone in the northeast of the DR Congo by allies turned warlords, now sharing the fate of poorer members of the Congolese diaspora throughout Africa. Pitched against them are nation makers and breakers in more traditional modes: warlords in the employ of defensive and/or expansionist states in the Great Lakes region, and their entrepreneurial side-kicks with both trans- and sub-national (ie regional, global and ethnic–local) modes of operation and paths of accumulation.\(^{63}\)

Can primitive accumulation and nation-state construction—with a little bit of democratisation—evolve from a combination of pillage and plunder on the one hand and the discourse of emancipatory politics articulated by the remnants of the RCD’s ‘political wing’ on the other? Such a vision either entails a ‘new’ DR Congo with borders intact, strengthened by the past few years of invasions and rebellions, one fractured into a federal structure, or perhaps even permanently broken up with various of its regions under Ugandan and Rwandan control. Less optimistic perspectives on the political economy of wartorn Africa combine Paul Collier’s microeconomics with Mark Duffield’s global view: easily obtainable minerals lead to warlordism, and the strictures of global accumulation deny borderland states the opportunity to industrialise—let alone constitutionalise.\(^{64}\) Peripheral capitalism under neoliberal globalisation does not lead to the endpoint of classical state formation or primitive accumulation: it neither makes strong states nor an industrial proletariat.

It is this conundrum that has ethnic essentialists, such as US policy maker Kansteiner, dreaming of ‘pure’ new nations.\(^{65}\) His musings suggest that, by the simple act of creating new states, an either naïve or Machiavellian superpower can break the Great Lakes and Congolese impasse. Other less interested observers have noted the disruption of colonial borders, but have no simplistic solutions. Achille Mbembe, for example, has noted that South Africa’s ‘virtual frontier stretches from the Cape to Katanga.’\(^{66}\) That is closer than ever to Rhodes’ ancient desire to reach Cairo, but fails to give Robert Mugabe’s intervention in the DR Congo—against the wishes of the South Africans—due credence.\(^{67}\) From the cosmopolitan nationalists to those wanting to divide up the Congo along imagined ethnic communities\(^{68}\)—or simply wherever the minerals are—the political economy and ‘identity’ sides of the national question are intricately bound up with processes of globalisation.

The UN Report, too, hints of a ‘virtual frontier’ hastened by the actions of the one country whose identity is most closely tied to the notion of ‘frontiers’, be they in the ‘wild west’ or in space. Between the lines of the Security Council’s report on the DR Congo’s neighbours’ exploitation of its natural resources there are hints that Mbembe’s talk of Rwandan and Ugandan ‘military princedoms’ has to take place in the context of the superpowers, their transnational mining corporations and their ideologies. These princedoms may be ‘obsessed with security’ and erecting ‘ramparts ... against the groups they have earlier driven out by force’, and they may be ‘clon[ing] themselves ... in neighbouring countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo whose state structures have proved fragile and unstable’. They may ‘join forces with their own diasporas who
have been in place for years but whose citizenship is disputed’ and may also have worked hand in hand with agents such as the Rally for Congolese Democracy—”rebels”, dissidents and others who serve as a screen for their intervention’. Their plans, to ‘divide up the Congo area into economic fiefdoms each with different kinds of wealth (minerals, forests, plantations, etc)’, to parcel them up into ‘monopolies and franchises’ and then to ‘impose an informal guardianship over these regions’ may well be on the way to fruition.69

However, Mbembe leaves out the fact that in the post-cold war era the dictates of neoliberalism deny any African state—be it a reconstructed Zaire or a newly constructed ethnic homeland—the means of effective state sovereignty and the foundation for substantive national citizenship. Joseph Kabila or Paul Kagame will suffice for the doyens of the World Bank as long as they both practise the doctrine of laissez-faire for the corporations wishing to mine the territories in their region: this is no doubt why on his ascension to his father’s throne the young Kabila was so eager to impress the outside world and to sign its economic memoranda. In the end, the mining corporations have no regard for sovereignty unless it protects their investments and does not tax them too heavily.

South Africa: dallying with democracy

In South Africa the issues of primitive accumulation (vis à vis the land issue as articulated along lines of restitution and resettlement, and the question of ‘traditional’ rulers in as much as they control access to land for nearly 17 million people) and of nation-state formation (including issues of race and ethnicity) also remain unresolved.70 However, speaking in a linear and developmental fashion, the country is much further down the road to ‘modernisation’ than the DRC or Zimbabwe. This is also the case with democracy—the most intangible side of peripheral capitalism’s development triangle. There may be no country in the world where CB Macpherson’s formulation regarding the tension between the liberal equality promised by democratic politics and the inequality forced on the majority of a ‘people’ by liberal markets is as apt as in South Africa.71 Its status as the world’s most unequal society (along with Brazil) adds tension to its constitutional equality between social rights and their ‘first order’ liberal counterparts. As Rita Abrahamsen has shown, attempts on the rest of the continent to marry social democracy with neoliberal/Schumpeterian polyarchy have had poor results on both counts.72 Much-vaunted ‘exceptionalism’ aside, South Africa is not exempt from these lessons. As Patrick Heller notes, ‘political rights can be translated into social rights … only to the extent that lower class demands are organised and find effective representation in the state’.73 He also notes that, in an ‘era when globalisation has weakened the ability of nation-states to deploy the regulatory and redistributive instruments’ with which various social democratic compromises of an earlier era were struck, even societies like South Africa’s, where the ‘popular sectors’ have some ‘political clout’ may not be able to translate that power into socioeconomic benefits.74 Thus, John Saul justifiably states, South Africa’s ‘ever more sweeping neo-liberal socio-economic dispensation … has negated … a great deal of the country’s democratic advance’. As opposition to increasing inequality mounts, Saul suggests that it is likely
that the governing African National Congress (ANC) will resort to ‘ever more authoritarian methods’ to quell it. The logic of the post-cold war era bodes no better for South Africa than for Zimbabwe or the DR Congo.

While the international financial institutions, along with many representatives of South African capital, shored up ANC commitment to neoliberal economic policies, their ‘political’ brethren were attempting to keep ‘democracy’ compatible with the restraints of ‘short-term’ pain for long-term gain. The rest of this article explores how ‘democracy exporting agencies’ —a peculiar subspecies of the post-cold war era— operated at the moment when the Cold War and apartheid were about to end. It is easy to forget how nervous democracy’s global arbiters were on the eve of South African majority rule. Prospects of violence between the ANC and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), and of ANC socialism, worried such agencies as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the National Endowment for Democracy (which administers USAID funds to the democracy-exporting wings of the Republicans and the Democrats, ie the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI)). For them, ‘polyarchy’ was the political answer to the problems of the day. Their aid is an attempt at ‘social engineering’ to create and maintain a (neo)liberal society. To that end, US efforts to supersede the social democratic influence of donor-governments such as Sweden were remarkably quick: while it took more than 20 years (from the early 1970s to 1993) for Sweden to provide ‘more than $400 million … to South Africa’s underground civil society via the anti-apartheid struggle’, USAID swept into the country in 1985, when the endpoint was closer to hand. USAID had invested $338 million in aspirant democrats in South Africa by 1993.

In retrospect, it appears that the US investment in South African democracy had two phases. The first phase coincided with the Republican administrations of Ronald Reagan (1981–88) and George Bush (1989–92). This was a time when the Inkatha Freedom Party offered solace to those citizens and government representatives of the USA willing to see slightly beyond apartheid. In those days, the US promoters of polyarchy channelled funds towards the private sector and Inkatha Freedom Party-related institutions. Dr Oscar Dhlomo is a good example of the sort of person who benefited from that phase. In 1990 he left his ministership of the KwaZulu ‘homeland’ department of education to facilitate meetings among the leaders of the contesting parties in order to reduce violence and to work towards a smoothly functioning democratic system. He sold the idea of an organisation to perform such a function to Hank Cohen, the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs in the State Department at the time. Cohen gave him a letter that guaranteed him funding of five million rand a year to take to the USAID office in Pretoria. Thus was born the Institute for Multi-Party Democracy (IMPD), and the renewed career of a man who would play a key role, as member of the Independent Electoral Commission, in bringing Buthelezi to the 1994 election. That Dhlomo now directs Durban’s first casino may bolster arguments that this sort of aid promotes a new bourgeoisie and a politics to match it — but perhaps the IMPD did assist in the resolution of one of the problems it was to deal with. It may have helped reduce ANC–IFP violence in KwaZulu-Natal.

When the Clinton administration came to office at the end of 1992, US
attention shifted to the ANC (although the IRI continued to work with other parties, including the socialist Azanian People’s Organisation and the Pan African Congress). Critics on the left have been more or less silent on this shift, but those on the right are vocal: RW Johnson, the director of the Helen Suzman Foundation, contends that the South African Communist Party (SACP) and one-party Afro-populist tendencies within the ANC, were more likely to gain from such patronage than opposition loving liberals.79 It appears, however, that the SACP and ‘populists’ have had little impact on economic policies, which were arguably of more importance to North American ideology exporters than the essence of political liberalism. Yet, as Abrahamsen makes clear, and Saul’s points emphasise, the strains of structural adjustment programmes create opposition. Thus one must not only elaborate on the divide between liberal and social democracy (or social justice, ‘substantive democracy’ or ‘popular democracy’) but also investigate the ways in which formal democracy or the lack of it affects ‘second order’ rights. Does the lack of an opposition party commanding a modicum of support within the majority group in South Africa affect the vibrancy of ‘popular democracy’ and the sort of demands it would place on South Africa’s political economy? Or do the groups and movements flourishing across the country add up to enough ‘democracy’ to keep the ruling party and its class supporters honest?

South Africa’s democratic forces—alternative sources of opposition, in Booyens’s words—extend from the global to the local, ranging from ‘social movements and labour organisations, groupings within the African National Congress (ANC) and its alliance partners [the Congress of South African Trade Unions and the SACP]’ to ‘civil service components … [and] anomic or sporadically constituted groups of community actors’. Opposition in South Africa is manifested through means of ‘electoral contestation, to intra-ANC–SACP–Cosatu alliance debates, mass media and intellectual debates, pickets and protests [and] strikes’.80 The combination of class and other social forces (Booyens also suggests ‘opposition’ could include agencies such as the World Bank, which oppose the ANC’s slight slips toward social democracy or statism) is complex in itself and overlaid with the tentative (and contested) hegemony of global finance capital. That South African democracy emerged through struggles with and against a very state-encouraged process of racially structured capitalist accumulation means that it resonates with memory and myth.81 In as much as globalisation seems to bring increased inequality, the forces it unleashes in South Africa do not promise the democracy of hushed parliamentary halls, but of heated struggles outside their decorous doors. They are similar to the global calls for democracy challenging neoliberal globalisation everywhere, but are hardened by years of anti-apartheid struggle.

Liberals (calling themselves democrats) in South Africa fear the ANC’s move to authoritarianism, but do not seem to be making alliances with the forces ‘from below’ that simultaneously call for the end of market authoritarianism and a stop to forced removals. Liberals seem not to be calling for a stop to the privatisation of water, which will either make it unaffordable to most of those linked—or hoping to be linked—to its pipes, or create fiscal difficulties when the state keeps its promises to provide 6000 litres of free water per month for those in need.
Until one sees political liberals pulling away from those who do not mind political restraints in pursuit of the higher cause of neoliberalism, there seems little chance for either a ‘soft authoritarian’ developmental state in South Africa or a popularly driven historic bloc with a basic-needs agenda. Furthermore, it would seem that only one of these latter alternatives would pave the way for the resolution of the triple crisis facing South Africa and—in different ways—the DR Congo and Zimbabwe.

Conclusion: neo-liberal globalisation and the triple crisis of ‘modernisation’ in Africa

This article has assessed various facets of the triple crisis of ‘modernisation’ in Zimbabwe, the DR Congo and South Africa in the post-cold war era. It is too soon to say if the forces unleashed by unfettered global capital will take Africa over the hurdles of primitive accumulation, nation-state formation and their associated developmental deadlocks, but all indications suggest that the imposition of neoliberalism, in the absence of geostrategically grounded alternatives, means that the hurdles on the road to modernity are nearly insurmountable. If the requisite ‘public goods’ accompanying private bads are constructed in the next decade or two, the evidence may weigh in favour of a realist’s optimism. So far, however, it seems as if adherence to the public good has not been much in evidence. When it comes to the question of the dialectics of modernisation, the oft-quoted maxim of Scipio Africanus ‘there is always something new out of Africa’ seems not to hold in spite of its repetition. The vexing question remains: strong nation-states (built on more-or-less successful resolutions of the triple crisis of modernisation) have been historical prerequisites for ‘development’. If it is difficult to resurrect them in the era of neoliberal globalisation—and if a ‘global state’ built on progressive global organisations does not emerge in their absence—the future promises much more conflict and destitution. Perhaps, though, the deleterious effects of the current impasse will open space for the necessary social forces to emerge and generate the alternatives to Africa’s combination of old, new and uneven forms of capitalist development. As the South African poet Robert Berold has put it, ‘the ones who will care are here already’. However, for radical and progressive new political forms to emerge out of the processes of primitive accumulation, nation-state formation and democratisation in Africa, substantial changes in the post-cold war world order are necessary.

Notes

More than the usual vote of thanks must go to Mark Berger for organising both this special edition of Third World Quarterly and the panels at the July 2001 ISA Hong Kong ‘Globalisation’ Conference which facilitated it. But, most of all he should be thanked for his combination of intellectual leadership and patient prodding on the project.

On the problems of globalisation theory’s misuse of classical social theory and its ignorance of the traditional international relations discipline, see J Rosenberg, The Follies of Globalisation Theory, London: Verso, 2000 (the first two chapters are available on <www.theglobalsite.ac.uk/press/012rosenberg.htm>). Mark Berger’s introduction to this special issue has the merit that, in addition to problematising the notion of ‘national development’ and thus inadvertently heeding Rosenberg’s call to take traditional international relations theory seriously, it takes history—in which the construction and reconfiguration of ‘nation-states’ plays a primary role—seriously as well. At the same time, this article casts doubt on Berger’s argument that ‘globalisation’ originated in the 1970s, but accepts that ‘neoliberal’ globalisation is a qualitatively different phase of world history.


It should be noted that ‘Africa’ is used in this article to mean what is generally referred to as ‘sub-Saharan Africa’. That is the area excluding North Africa and including South Africa which, contrary to much ‘exceptionalist’ literature, is very much part of Africa. The case studies in this article are parts of southern Africa if one considers that they are members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). But in many respects this is a political organisation that hides as many differences as it incorporates similarities, especially regarding the DR Congo which, if it is part of any coherent ‘region’ is part of Central Africa and the Great Lakes region. In many cases the key historical and sociological differences among African social formations depend on the extent of settler colonialism within them.

Mark Berger’s introduction to this issue is unclear about these networks and institutions: perhaps akin to Hardt & Negri’s ‘multitudes’ they could range from United Nations humanitarians to the demonstrators at Seattle, Prague and Genoa. In Africa the anti-debt movement Jubilee 2000 may best represent them, but it is unclear how well they articulate with the present deep structural changes—or impasses—in most of Africa.

Colin Leys has noted that in Africa colonialism did not transform land and labour into commodities.


The Mugabe régime is adept at labelling the working class-based social democratic opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change, as imperialism’s puppet. The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) supported the MDC-linked Zimbabwean Congress of Trade Union’s (whose former secretary-general, Morgan Tsvangirai, is now MDC president) two day general strike in mid-July 2001. Minister for Information (and former political science professor) Jonathan Moyo said COSATU: is “anti-African”, “imperialist”, “xenophobic” and “Anglo American-influenced”, whose real solidarity was with “imperialists” who call themselves “globalists”’. Hogarth, ‘Wake up and smell the coffee’, Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 8 July 2001. Given the neoliberal tone of some MDC economic policies such allegations hold some truth—although it is clear that ZANU-PF’s enthusiastic use of such policies throughout the late 1980s and 1990s contributed to its current crisis.


B Peta, ‘New land grab to put 300 000 jobs on the line’, Financial Gazette, 5 July 2001. Zimbabwe’s land mass is around 33.3 million hectares, half of which are in the ‘communal areas’, 11.2 million of which in 1998 were classified as ‘large commercial scale farms’ averaging 2000 hectares, 1.2 million of which were under cultivation by 10 000 small commercial farmers, and 3.5 million of which had been resettled since 1980 by some 70 000 families. S Moyo, ‘The political economy of land acquisition and redistribution in Zimbabwe: 1990–1999’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 26(1), 2000, pp 5–28. It is unclear how many hectares have been ‘invaded’ and settled since early 2000: Mugabe claims 105 000 families, the Commercial Farmers Union 35 000. ‘Mugabe says democracy “extraneous” in land crisis’, Mail and Guardian, 11 June 2001; and F Masiokwadzo, ‘35 000 people settled: CFU’, Zimbabwe Independent, 3 August 2001.


S Moyo’s writings counter these assertions with evidence that small African farmers are more efficient than large commercial ones: in any case, if Cliffe (‘The politics of land reform in Zimbabwe’, p 44) is correct many large commercial farmers have moved to horticulture and other crops for export to European niche markets.

Before 1980 Zimbabwe had a number of different names and territorial incarnations. In the late 1880s the British South African Company named the general region, of which present-day Zimbabwe and Zambia are a part. Zambia. In 1895 the region was renamed Rhodesia, or the Rhodesia Protectorate, after Cecil Rhodes. From 1902 until 1964 what is now Zimbabwe was called Southern Rhodesia. Between 1953 and 1963 Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia were loosely joined with Nyasaland to form the Central African Federation. The Central African Federation was officially dissolved in 1963 and Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland became the independent nation-states of Zambia and Malawi in 1964. In 1965 the white settlers in Southern Rhodesia, under the leadership of Ian Smith, promulgated the Unilateral Declaration of Independence from the United Kingdom and until 1979 the territory was known as Rhodesia. In 1979, when an ‘internal settlement’ produced a compromise government, ostensibly led by Bishop Abel Muzorewa, the country was named Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. With majority rule and independence in 1980 the territory was named ‘Zimbabwe’, the name that had been used by nationalists since 1960.

This section expands on D Moore, ‘Is the land the economy and the economy the land?’ and ‘Democracy is coming to Zimbabwe’. Colonial administrators were quite confused: some admired and wished to foster the evolution of capitalist farmers, while others feared the consequences for white farmers and mine-owners. In 1907 one observer noted that ‘the local native is getting rich … One can hardly see the smallest kraal without … a herd of 20 to 50 head of cattle, plus sheep and goats … some kraals possess hundreds … a good sign so far as the welfare of the native is concerned, but not encouraging from a labour point of view’. Another felt the best way to solve the problem was to ‘put … the native cultivator … in
reserves … so far away from railways and markets that the white trader will not be able to buy from him and compete with the white farmers’. I Phimister, An Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe 1890–1948: Capital Accumulation and Class Struggle, London: Longman, 1998, p 65.


36 Given the ruling party’s Chinese links and its opposition to the other main nationalist party, the Zimbabwean African People’s Union, which was assisted by the Soviet Union, ZANU-PF was reluctant to embrace the USSR’s style and substance. On the Matabeleland massacres see the Catholic Commission on Justice and Peace, Breaking the Silence: Building True Peace, Harare: CCJP, 1997.


40 As Sam Moyo affirms, ‘this was more or less at gunpoint. Everybody missed that point, but this was a critical point’. ‘IRIN interview with land expert Sam Moyo’. The cost (in late 1997 exchange rates) was reported to be Z$4.5 billion.


46 I owe insights on this question to Professor B Philippe Biyoya Makutu of the University of Lubumbashi, with whom I spoke in Kinshasa in July 2000. When Laurent-Désiré Kabila gained the presidency in 1997 he changed the name to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. At the time of independence the name was changed from Belgian Congo to the Republic of the Congo. Mobutu named his state ‘Zaire’ in 1971. Before independence it was called the Congo Free State, under King Leopold of Belgium’s ‘private’ rule from 1885 to 1908. When it was placed under the sovereignty of the Belgian parliament in 1908, it became known as the Belgian Congo and remained so until independence in 1960.


48 Malaquias, ‘Diamonds are a guerrilla’s best friend’, p 317. On the RCD-ML see D Moore, ‘From King Leopold to King Kabila in the Congo: the continuities & contradictions of the long road from warlordism to democracy in the heart of Africa’, Review of African Political Economy, 87, 2001, pp 130–135. As this article was being completed (August 2001), preparatory meetings for the Inte—
Congoles Dialogue were held in Gaborone, Botswana (home of former Botswana President Sir Ketumile Masire, who was appointed ‘facilitator’ of the Dialogue in July 1999 under the terms of the Lusaka Accord). The Rally for Congolesse Democracy Movement, despite having been effectively eliminated by warlords within its ranks and not being supported by its erstwhile Ugandan sponsors since November 2000, was—surprisingly—reinstated as an official participant. Whether this is because their predictions about the untrustworthiness of their interlopers have come to pass or for other reasons, the RCD-ML presence at the Dialogue ensures that the process is not completely dominated by the logic of the war mode of production.


50 Malaquias, ‘Diamonds are a guerrilla’s best friend’, p 317. On the RCD-ML travels see Moore, ‘From King Leopold to King Kabila in the Congo’. It would be worthwhile to pursue a comparative study of the RCD-ML and the Zapatistas: their ideology is similar, but the conditions of their struggle and its international reception are markedly different. See Berger ‘The post-cold war condition’; and N Harvey, *The Chiapas Rebellion: The Struggle for Land and Democracy*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998.

51 Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars*; Duffield, ‘Globalisation, transborder trade, and war economies’; and Reno ‘Shadow states and the political economy of civil wars’.


57 Moore, ‘From King Leopold to King Kabila’.

58 The excellent A Hochschild, *King Leopold’s Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa*, Boston, MD: Houghton Mifflin, 1998 does not fall into that trap—but a superficial reading could allow one to give too much credit—or blame—to the Belgian king.


60 Noted in M Thierry’s excellent documentary, *Mobutu: King of Zaire*.


63 United Nations, *Report of the Panel of Experts*, makes extensive note of the trade in coltan, the essential mineral in such information age commodities as mobile telephones and Sony playstations, as well as the more traditional chains of resources and accumulation associated with such conflict.


65 See letter from Congresswoman McKinney to President Bush.


67 Some observers contend that Mugabe was quick to advance loans and armies to Kabila in order to gain access to DR Congo’s mines before South Africa had the chance, because the latter’s capitalists had beaten his countrymen to postwar Mozambique.

68 Apologies to Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of
Nationalism, London: Verso, 1983, but the imaginings and the media in which they are embedded are not only ‘national’ dreams, as the Radio Milles Collines demonstrates (unless one imagines ‘nation’ as solely a projection of ‘purely’ ethnic power).


R Abrahamsen, Disciplining Democracy.

P Heller, ‘Moving the state: the politics of democratic decentralization in Kerala, South Africa, and Porto Allegre’, Politics and Society, 29 (1), 2001, p 130. One should note that these demands often lead to more production for local needs, thus having beneficial ‘economic’ effects—if globalisation does not disrupt the link between territorially based demand-led growth and supply.


Interview, 23 March 2001, Durban.

R W Johnson, ‘Destroying South Africa’s democracy: USAID, the Ford Foundation, and civil society’, The National Interest, 53, 1998, pp 19–29. (Suzman was the only liberal white MP for much of the apartheid era, but her hesitation to advocate the universal franchise inspired suspicion among many anti-apartheid forces.)


Heller, ‘Moving the state’, pp 143–144.


